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authorities. – C. Limitations of actions. – D. Collective actions/pooling of claims. – 5. The (further) missing 
pieces of the puzzle: causation and quantification of damages: some concluding remarks. 
1. – Directive 2014/104/EU “on certain rules governing actions for damages under 
national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States 
and of the European Union” 1 (hereafter: Damages Directive) has been transposed in Ita-
ly by means of legislative Decree no. 3 of 2017 (hereafter: Decree 3/2017), 2 which 
largely reproduces the Directive not only with regard to the structure but also in respect 
of the wording of the provisions. 
As with other Member States, e.g. France, 3 Italian lawmakers opted to enact a lex 
specialis for antitrust damages actions and limited the implementation to what was nec-
essary, without any amendment to the codes of Italy, neither to the Code of Civil Proce-
dure nor to the Civil Code, the latter of which contains the general rules of tort law. 
 
 
1 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on cer-
tain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provi-
sions of the Member States and of the European Union [2014], OJ L349/1. 
2 L’Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato S.p.A., Decreto legislativo 19 gennaio 2017, n. 3, 
https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/archivioCompleto > 2017 > n°15 del 19-01-2017 > Decreto Legislativo 19 
gennaio 2017, n. 3 (accessed 6 June 2019). 
3 See, e.g. Laurence Idot, Private damages actions before and after the Implementation of the Directive: 
I. France 4, 4 et seq. (Implementation of the EU Damages Directive into Member State law, Conference, 
Würzburg, 5 May 2017, Concurrences N° 3-2017). 
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Although pragmatic at a first glance, such a choice makes the interplay between general 
rules and principles, on the one hand, and the “special regime” for antitrust damages ac-
tions, on the other, somehow harsh. Moreover, from a systematic point of view, that inter-
play could even turn into a clash where the new set of rules, while having a relevant inci-
dence on the private law remedy concerned (i.e. civil liability), fails to fully overlap with it. 
This will undermine the interpretative argument “rule-exception” and potentially convert 
what was meant to be a form of a practical solution into an increasing theoretical problem. 
2. – The enactment of the Damages Directive, while urged by the ECJ’s Pfeiderer de-
cision and the resulting threats to the strength of leniency programs, 4 marked the reach-
ing of an important intersection along the “winding road” towards the establishment of 
an effective antitrust private enforcement mechanism in Europe, complementary to the 
public one and to its best functioning. 5 
However, while concededly remarkable in many aspects, it will likely prove to be a 
sort of intermediate destination more than the landing place, an approach stage more 
than an epiphany itself of (US-style) regulation achieved through private litigation, 
sketched out by the modernization package 6 in the wake of the ECJ’s case law on the di-
rect effect of EU primary law and the so-called Community-based right to damages. 7 
 
 
4 See ECJ, Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161. Cf. Sven B. Völcker’s 
note (2012) 49 CML Rev., 695, 716. 
5 See, e.g., Mario Libertini, ‘Il ruolo necessariamente complementare di “private” it e “public enforce-
ment” in materia di antitrust’in Marisaria Maugeri and Andrea Zoppini (eds), Funzioni del diritto privato e 
tecniche di regolazione del mercato, 171, 174 (Il Mulino 2009). 
6 See Regulation 1/2003/EC of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2002], OJ L 001, Recital 6, assessing as crucial 
the role played by national courts ‘in applying the Community competition rule’, by deciding disputes be-
tween private individuals, ‘for example by awarding damages to the victims of infringements’; see further-
more Art. 6 of the cited Regulation: ‘National courts shall have the power to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty’. As regards the ‘modernization’ of EU competition law see David J. Gerber, Two forms of moderni-
zation in European Competition Law (2008) 31 Fordham International Law Journal, 1235. See also Claus 
Dieter Ehlermann, The modernization of EC antitrust policy: a legal and cultural revolution (2000) 37 
CML Rev., 537; Barry Rodger and Angus MacCulloch, Competition Law and Policy in the EC and UK 52 
(3rd ed., Cavendish Pub. Ltd, 2004). 
7 The expression ‘Community law based right to damages’ is used by Assimakis P. Komninos, New 
prospects for private enforcement of EC competition laws (2002) 39 CML Rev. 447, 449. As to the case 
law on the direct effect of the EC Treaty norms cf. ECJ, Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport en Expeditie 
Onderneming van Gend & Loos v NederlandseAdministratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1; ECJ, Case C-
127/63 BRT v SABAM [1974] ECR 313; ECJ, Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich v Repubblica 
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The reason for such a cautious evaluation involves the nature of the opted-for source 
of law and its contents; put briefly: what it is and what it says. The following parts of the 
analysis will focus on both aspects from mainly an Italian law perspective, but some 
broader preliminary remarks will be offered as well. 
The adoption of a Directive was certainly not an obvious choice, when one takes into 
account where we come from. To that point, there was Regulation 1/2003, which had a 
fully binding effect and already contained, among others, a specific norm (article 6) con-
ferring competence upon national courts in relation to articles 101 and 102 TFEU, 8 not 
to mention its Recital 7, stressing the role played by national courts as regards the pro-
tection of subjective rights under Community law, “for example by awarding damages to 
the victims of infringements”. 
That being said, opting for a Directive tells us even more than the switching towards a 
soft harmonization strategy, since it reveals a background of ambitious plans that re-
mained largely frustrated by the proof of facts, 9 and it also induces some pessimism re-
garding the near future. 
The reasons why the modernization package 10 was unable to promote private damag-
es actions and overcome the situation of both an astonishing diversity between national 
legislation and an underdevelopment of available remedies – as remarked by the Ashurst 
Report in 2004 11 and as repeatedly stressed six years later by Advocate General Mazak 
 
 
italiana [1991] ECR I-5357, [1993] 2 CML Rev. 66; ECJ, Case C-128/92 Banks & Co Ltd v British Cool 
Co [1994] ECR I-1209, para. 36-45: ‘the principle established in Francovich can also be applied to the case 
of breach of a right which an individual derives from an obligation imposed by Community law on another 
individual’. The statement about the importance of (private) actions for damages before national courts, re-
lated to infringements of EU competition law, has also become a sort of leit motif in the ECJ’s jurispru-
dence concerning the issue: see the landmark decisions of the ECJ, Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard 
Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courge Ltd and Others [2001] ECR I-6297 and ECJ, Joined Cases C-295/04 
to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi and Others v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others [2006] ECR I-
6619. The direct effect of EU competition law rules as well as ‘the right in Union law to compensation for 
harm resulting from infringements of Union and national competition law’ are clearly emphasized by Re-
citals 3 and 4 of the Damages Directive. 
8 Whenever to be applied in combination with or in parallel to national antitrust rules. 
9 See, e.g., Brien, Idot et al., supra n. Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito., at 7, noting that ‘The Dam-
ages Directive is an exercise in frustration and a glaring example of how EU competition policy may lose 
its legitimacy in the eyes of the “European citizen”‘. See also the Editorial Comments ‘One bird in the 
hand…’ The Directive on damages actions for breach of the competition rules (2014) 51 CML Rev., 1333, 
1334.  
10 Beginning with its preparatory document as represented by the European Commission’s Green Paper 
on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2005) 672 final and the European Commis-
sion’s White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM (2008) 165 final. 
11 See Denis Waelbroeck, Donald Slater & Gil Even-Shoshan, Study on the conditions of claims for 
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in his Opinion on the Pfeiderer case 12 ‒ are well known and have been accurately ana-
lyzed by scholarly opinion, 13 reasons beginning with a series of obstacles concerning 
procedural rules at national level. 14 
As a Directive is binding just as to the ends, and given that the EU legislature did not 
opt for a strong “full harmonization approach” similar to that one recently adopted by the 
EU legislation in the field of consumer rights, 15 the Damages Directive comes along 
with a high risk of leaving room for persisting differences between national legislation, 
in spite of its main goal of promoting a level playing field for undertakings and consum-
ers 16 and notwithstanding the duty of consistent interpretation. 17 More remarkably, 
while mainly dealing with tortious liability, 18 it shows a range of action narrower than 
that which is necessary by simply introducing “certain rules governing” antitrust damage 
claims. 
 
 
damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules: comparative report (Ashurst 2004). 
12 Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer, supra n 4, Opinion of AG Mazák, at para. 40: ‘Regulation No 1/2003 and 
the case-law of the Court have not established any de jure hierarchy or order of priority between public en-
forcement of EU competition law and private actions for damages. While no de jure hierarchy has been es-
tablished, at present the role of the Commission and national competition authorities is, in my view, of far 
greater importance than private actions for damages in ensuring compliance with Articles 101 and 101 
TFEU. Indeed so reduced is the current role of private actions for damages in that regard that I would hesi-
tate in overly using the term “private enforcement”‘. The lack of uniformity in national legislation has been 
underlined by ECJ in its Manfredi decision: see Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi, supra n. 7, 
para. 72. 
13 See, e.g., Andreas Heinemann, ‘Remedies in Antitrust Law’ in Thomas M.J. Möllers and Andreas 
Heinemann (eds), The Enforcement of Competition Law in Europe 450 (Cambridge University Press 
2009). 
14 See, e.g., Enrico Camilleri, A decade of EU antitrust private enforcement: chronicle of a failure fore-
told? (2014) 10 ECLR 531, 537. 
15 Cf. Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on con-
sumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council [2011], OJ L 304/64, Art. 4. Pursuant to Damages Directive Art. 5, pa-
ra. 8: ‘Without prejudice to paragraphs 4 and 7 and to Article 6, this Article shall not prevent Member 
States from maintaining or introducing rules which would lead to wider disclosure of evidence’. 
16 See Damages Directive Recitals 7-10. 
17 See ECJ, Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA [1990] 
ECR I-4135. 
18 Which is supposed to be the most versatile among the private law remedies for achieving the pursued 
goals and which is at least in part recalled by Damages Directive Recital 5, pursuant to which ‘Actions for 
damages are only one element of an effective system of private enforcement of infringements of competi-
tion law and are complemented by alternative avenues of redress, such as consensual dispute resolution and 
public enforcement decisions that give parties an incentive to provide compensation’. 
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As consequence, the Directive is based on a non-exhaustive, even sketchy, soft har-
monization approach, one whose key feature may be synthesized as “I’d like to, but I 
can’t”. Caught between policy and actual facts (i.e. normative data), it searches for an 
advanced equilibrium between the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, on the 
one hand, and of national autonomy, on the other; as Recital 11 makes quite clear: “In 
the absence of Union law, actions for damages are governed by the national rules and 
procedures of the Member States” but in compliance with the “principles of effective-
ness and equivalence”. 
To sum up, although ultimately in line with the norms of the Treaties (particularly ar-
ticle 5 TEU and articles 103 and 114 TFEU, which provide the Directive’s legal basis 19) 
and despite the introduction of somehow useful measures, the Directive’s deficiencies – 
although in part unavoidable at the present stage – threaten to affect the effectiveness of 
private enforcement considerably. 
It is certainly true that a softly harmonized regime – one made up of principles and 
rules such as the exclusion of any overcompensation for private claims, the assessment 
of binding effects of NCAs decisions, immunity measures for leniency applicants, a se-
ries of rebuttable presumptions softening the burden of proof on claimants, the law of 
limitation, basic rules on joint and several liability and, lastly, an opening up of both de-
fensive and offensive recourse to a passing-on argument – represents something new, 
needed and, in the end, positive. 20 Nonetheless, the Directive remains to a large extent 
uncompleted. 
It is uncompleted from the antitrust law viewpoint since, beyond any declaration of 
principle, it deals with certain kinds of violations only, mainly cartels and to some extent 
exploitative conduct in general. 
Uncompleted from the private law viewpoint since, as noted above, it flattens (better: 
impoverishes) private antitrust enforcement to just tortious liability, without taking into 
account other tailor-made remedies such as injunctions or interim relief. 21 
Last but not least, even uncompleted from the tort law viewpoint since crucial issues 
remain sometimes untouched despite being evoked (as is the case for causation), some-
times sideways brushed (as is the case for the proof of harm suffered by individuals and 
 
 
19 See Damages Directive Recital 54. 
20 See, e.g., Pier Luigi Porcu, Giorgio Monti & Marco Botta (eds), Private Enforcement of EU Competi-
tion Law: The Impact of the Damages Directive (Edward Elgar Publishing 2018). 
21 See for critical remarks, F.G. Wilman, The end of the absence? The growing body of EU legislation 
on private enforcement and the main remedies it provides for (2016) 53 CML Rev. 887, 909. 
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for quantification of damages) and sometimes unmentioned although impending as a 
stone guest (as is the case for collective redress mechanisms). 
3. – Since the most probative test aimed at verifying the aforementioned critical re-
marks cannot help but being the field of national legislation, the Italian one offers useful 
food for thought. 
Despite the fact that one of the ECJ’s leading decisions on private antitrust enforce-
ment (the Manfredi case 22) originated as a follow-on action filed before an Italian court 
which subsequently submitted it to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, and notwithstanding 
a (sort of) class action regime already being in force, the number of private actions regis-
tered to date in Italy, even if rising in recent years, has proven to be very limited both in 
absolute terms and on a comparative basis with other jurisdictions, such as Germany, 
UK and the Netherlands. 23 
The reasons for the minimal amount of actions are manifold and involve either civil 
procedure or substantive law rules, as well as the main features of the harm that a victim 
may suffer from third parties’infringement of competition law rules, irrespective of the 
fact whether he/she is a competitor or not, a direct or an indirect purchaser, a business or 
a consumer. 24 The combination of these factors have made the Italian jurisdiction less 
plaintiff-friendly and attractive than other jurisdictions in Europe, with the side effect of 
deterring private parties from bringing actions for antitrust damages, if not even trigger-
ing a forum shopping phenomenon. 
As unanimously recognized, antitrust cases are fact-intensive. 25 Therefore, as soon as 
we think about the ideal dialectic between the subjects who may be potentially involved 
in a downstream damage claim, the emergence of an informative asymmetry soon throws 
a shadow over the chances for the injured party to sue. 
 
 
22 Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi, supra n. 7. 
23 See, e.g., Roberto Chieppa, Il recepimento in Italia della Dir. 2014/104/UE e la prospettiva 
dell’AGCM (2016) 24 Il Diritto Industriale 314, 321; Massimo Scuffi, Riflessioni a margine della Dir. 
104/2014 (e del D.lgs 3/2017) sull’azione di classe (2017) 25 Il Diritto Industriale 5, 8. 
24 See, e.g., Alexander Italianer, Competition Law within a framework of rights and the Commission’s 
proposal for a Directive on antitrust damage actions (12th Annual conference of the Association of Europe-
an Competition Law Judges (AECLJ), Luxembourg, 14 June 2013) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ 
speeches/text/sp2013_06_en.pdf (accessed 23 April 2019). 
25 See, e.g., Alexander Bruns, ‘Private Enforcement of Competition Law: Evidence’ in Jürgen Basedow, 
Jörg Philipp Terhechte and Ludos Tichý (eds), Private Enforcement of Competition Law 127, 130 (Nomos 
2011). See also Damages Directive Recital 45. 
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The occurrence of anticompetitive behavior, which is to say the main source of the 
harm suffered, does in fact represent the very first element to be proved for access to the 
remedy in tort. It should also be noted that besides not being easily detectable as to its 
material dimension – at least whenever hidden by the conspiracy of silence between the 
co-infringers in cases of collusive misconduct – that behavior counts as a violation of 
competition law rules insofar as a series of other conditions are fulfilled, most of which 
are based on economic data. 
Such premise is now clearly pointed out by Recital 14 of the Damages Directive, stat-
ing that whereas the assessment of any antitrust infringement rests on “a complex factual 
and economic analysis ... t]he evidence necessary to prove a claim ... is often held exclu-
sively by the opposing party or by third parties, and is not sufficiently known by, or ac-
cessible to, the claimant”. 
That being said, the Italian legislation made – and to some extent still makes – things 
even worse off for a plaintiff by imposing on him a heavy burden of proof and by making 
it difficult to access the specific and necessary information for bringing an action in tort. 
Pursuant to article 2697 of the Italian Civil Code (hereafter: Italian CC), the party 
who claims a right has the burden to prove the facts supporting his or her claim (“onus 
probandi incumbit ei qui dicit”); therefore, in the absence of specific norms 26 – like 
those recently adopted by the Damages Directive, introducing some rebuttable legal pre-
sumptions – the injured party has to prove the defendant’s (illegal) conduct, the qualified 
harm suffered (“danno ingiusto”) and the existence of a causal link between the conduct 
and the harm: in other words, the injured party has to prove the existence of the whole 
set of conditions required for the remedy in tort to be invoked, pursuant to article 2043 
Italian CC. 
On the other hand, according to the Civil Procedure Code (hereafter: Italian CPC), 
neither does the claimant have a comprehensive right to demand disclosure nor can the 
judge order it without any limit. Pursuant to Article 210 Italian CPC and 94 of the provi-
sions for the implementation of the Italian CPC (region decreto No. 1368/1941), a dis-
closure may be granted upon application of a party only for a precisely identified docu-
ment and only to the extent that it is necessary. Disclosure remains in any case precluded 
when it may cause a serious harm to the party that has to disclose the document. 27 
 
 
26 See, e.g., Marco De Cristofaro, Innovazioni e prospettive nella dimensione processuale che sta al 
cuore del private antitrust enforcement [2018] Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate 523, 531, 533. 
27 See Marcella Negri, Disclosure of documents that lie in the control of the parties: IV. Italy 12, 18 
(Implementation of the EU Damages Directive into Member State law, Conference, Würzburg, 5 May 
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Further elements, mostly pertaining to the main features of domestic tort law, have al-
so concurred to interfere with private antitrust claims, beginning with the rules on causa-
tion and on quantification of damages. Since, however, they remained untouched by the 
Damages Directive, the assessment as to whether they still remain problematic in the 
cases at issue should be postponed to the analysis of those provisions recently introduced 
(or at least of some of them). 
For now, it suffices to say that the combined effect of the typical informative asym-
metry between the potentially involved parties and the strict regime on proof has led to a 
“claimant-adverse environment” for antitrust damages actions in Italy, a situation at high 
risk of even “imped[ing] the effective exercise of the right to compensation guaranteed 
by the TFEU”. 28 
It is however worth noting that the Italian courts, mainly the Corte di Cassazione, 
have tried to soften such a posture and strengthen the alignment of, on one hand, sub-
stantive/procedural rules and, on the other, the push towards the availability of tort rem-
edies in antitrust cases as have emerged at the European level. 
Two decisions especially deserve to be mentioned in this regard. In the first one, 
which dates back to 2005, the Court of Cassazione abandoned its restrictive attitude and 
recognized the existence of a legally qualified interest in the competitive structure of the 
market, thereby entitling, for the very first time, all market players – either consumers or 
rival undertakings – to enforce the remedy in tort for the protection of that interest, once 
violated by specific monopolistic conduct. 29 In the second one, from 2015, the Court fa-
voured in a stand-alone action an extensive interpretation of the Italian rules on proof in 
order to be consistent with the Damages Directive, although not yet implemented at that 
time, and simply required that the plaintiff provided serious, plausible circumstantial ev-
idence of the alleged anticompetitive conduct of the defendant. 30 
Though positive, the emergence of such a posture from the courts was however sur-
rounded by the uncertainties that are typical of “judge-made law”. Decree 3/2017 should 
therefore provide for a much more stable framework. 
As aptly observed by scholarly opinion, within the Directive, and therefore within the 
 
 
2017, Concurrences N° 3-2017). 
28 As feared by Damages Directive Recital 14: ‘strict legal requirements for claimants to assert in detail 
all the facts of their case at the beginning of an action and to proffer precisely specified items of supporting 
evidence can unduly impede the effective exercise of the right to compensation guaranteed by the TFEU’. 
29 See Corte di Cassazione, no. 2207, 4 February 2005, [2005] Giurisprudenza italiana 1675, later con-
firmed also by Corte di Cassazione, no. 2305, 2 February 2007, [2007] Foro italiano 1097. 
30 See Corte di Cassazione, no. 11564, 4 June 2015. 
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implementing norms, the procedural dimension occupies centre stage. 31 And in fact, just 
moving from those obstacles to the private antitrust enforcement that I have emphasized 
above as emblematic under Italian law, useful new legal provisions quickly come to 
one’s attention. 
First of all, there is the introduction of a series of rebuttable presumptions in favour of 
the plaintiff. Pursuant to article 12(2) Decree 3/2017 (in conformity with Article 14 of 
the Damages Directive), the passing-on of the overcharge from the defendant to the 
plaintiff (i.e. the indirect purchaser) is presumed whenever certain detailed conditions are 
fulfilled; even more remarkably, pursuant to article 14(2) of the same provision (in con-
formity with article 17 of the Damages Directive), the existence of a harm caused by a 
cartel is presumed as well. In both cases the presumptions are rebuttable. 32 
Secondly, as regards the disclosure of evidence, the measures enshrined in article 5 of 
the EU Damages Directive, implemented through article 3 Decree 3/2017, have had the 
result that antitrust damages actions are governed by a less strict rule than article 210 
Italian CPC, mentioned above: to mention just the main features of the (new) special re-
gime, the party seeking disclosure is no longer requested to provide an ex ante precise 
description of the sought document/evidence, and the judge’s order of disclosure, even if 
within the limits of a proportionality test, may concern even “relevant categories of evi-
dence” once the plausibility of the claim is verified. 33 
4. – A. – Following the methodological indications provided by the editors, I will now fo-
cus on a list of selected issues that are pivotal for the best promotion of private antitrust en-
forcement and arguably critical in terms of their potential impact on domestic legislation. 
The first issue to be dealt with concerns the identification of the entity liable for com-
petition law infringements. 
 
 
31 Cf. De Cristofaro, supra n. 26, at 529. 
32 See Enrico Camilleri, Il risarcimento del danno per violazioni del diritto della concorrenza: ambito di 
applicazione e valutazione del danno [2018] Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate 143, 159; Mario Todino, 
Il danno risarcibile [2015] AIDA 15, 23. 
33 In order to prevent ‘fishing expeditions’. See, e.g., Guiseppe Finocchiaro, La disciplina dell’esibi-
zione delle prove nei giudizi risarcitori per violazione delle norme antitrust in attuazione della Dir. 
2014/104 UE [2018] Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate 415; Paolo Comoglio, Note a una prima lettura 
del d.lgs n. 3 del 2017. Novità processuali e parziali inadeguatezze in tema di danno antitrust [2017] Riv. 
Trim. Dir. e Proc. Civ. 991; see Marcella Negri, supra n. 27, at 18; Marco De Cristofaro, Onere probatorio 
e disciplina delle prove quale presidio di efficienza del private antitrust enforcement [2015] AIDA 100; 
Andrea Giussani, Direttiva e principi del processo civile italiano [2015] AIDA 251. 
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Article 2(2) Damages Directive states: “infringer means an undertaking or association 
of undertakings which has committed an infringement of competition law”. This defini-
tion was carried over verbatim by Italian lawmakers in article 2(1) (a) Decree 3/2017. 
On first reading, the aforementioned definition simply echoes the cartel prohibition 
(article 101 TFEU) and its typical subjective profile (namely: “agreements between un-
dertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings”), so that one may argue that the 
liable legal entity cannot be anything but the cartelist, as such and along with the co-
infringers, within the mechanism of joint and several liability recently introduced. 34 
An in-depth analyses, however, reveals also a secondary, hidden meaning so as to take 
into account the economic unit doctrine as elaborated in the wake of some leading cases. 
As it is well known, according to the ECJ’s interpretation, the application of article 
101 TFUE should be excluded for intra-corporate group agreements, to the extent that 
the companies at issue have such an intense and close economic relationship as to form a 
single economic entity. 35 
At the same time, in the Akzo Nobel judgment, the Court made clear that the meaning 
of “undertakings”, for the application of administrative fines in relation to Article 101 
TFEU, “must be understood as designating an economic unit even if in law that econom-
ic unit consists of several persons, natural or legal”. Moreover, the Court stated that 
whenever “such an economic entity infringes the competition rules, it falls, according to 
the principle of personal responsibility, to that entity to answer for that infringement” 
while “the conduct of a subsidiary may be imputed to the parent company in particular 
where, although having a separate legal personality, that subsidiary does not decide in-
dependently (…) but carries out, in all material respects, the instructions given to it by 
the parent company”. 36 
 
 
34 See Damages Directive Art. 11 and, as for Italy, Art. 9 Decree 3/2017. It should be noticed that the 
ECJ has adopted a functional approach, according to which it is stated that ‘in the context of competition 
law, first that the concept of an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, re-
gardless of the legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed and, secondly, that employment 
procurement is an economic activity’: See ECJ, Case C-41/90 Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser and Macrotron 
GmbH [1991] ECJ I-1979, para. 21. 
35 See, in the sense of the autonomy between the companies of a group maintaining complete economic 
independence ECJ, Case C-22/71 Béguelin Import Co. and Others And S.A.G.L. Import Export, Nice and 
Others [1971] ECR 949. See, for the opposite, ECJ, Case C-97/08 P Akzo Nobel NV and Others v Commis-
sion of the European Communities [2009] ECR I-8237, paras 55-58. As for the doctrine see, e.g., Richard 
Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law, 93 (ninth ed., Oxford University Press 2018). 
36 See ECJ, Case 48/69 Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission of the European Communities 
[1972] ECR 619; see also Case No. C-97/08 Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission, supra n. 35, paras 55-
58; ECJ, Case C-217/05 Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio v Compañía 
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Against this background, different scenarios need to be distinguished: 
It could be that, notwithstanding the existence of a parent company, the subsidiary 
has definite economic autonomy; under these circumstances, the latter is, when partici-
pating in a cartel, the infringer to be sued. 
It may also happen that where a cartel involves just those companies whose relation-
ship embodies a single economic unit, the cartel itself indeed disappears, sometimes be-
ing superseded by a different kind of infringement consisting of an abuse of dominant 
position, in the wake of Viho decision. 37 
Finally, the situation may arise where a cartel does involve two or more undertakings, 
one of them being part of an economic unit in which the subsidiary acted. In such a case, 
the conduct of the subsidiary can be imputed to the parent company so that both compa-
nies are jointly and severally liable. 
As mentioned above, the last scenario does frequently occur in connection with the 
application of administrative fines, thus in cases pertaining to the sphere of public en-
forcement. 38 
That being said, the question to answer now is whether such an “economic unit” doc-
trine, also applies in cases of civil liability for harm caused by anticompetitive conduct. In 
other words, is to be clarified whether the claimant is able to sue also the parent company 
of a cartelist (subsidiary) by invoking the existence of a legal unit between them, its being 
alleged or presumed 39 that the latter did not decide independently upon its own conduct on 
 
 
Española de Petróleos SA [2006] ECR I-11987. The ECJ has declared that the autonomous parent compa-
ny’s responsibility exists whenever is proved that it exercised a decisive influence over the subsidiary: see 
also ECJ, Joined cases C-293/13 and C-294/13 Fresh Del Monte Produce Inc v. European Commission 
[2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:416, para. 75. It is, furthermore, worth highlighting the judicial tendency towards 
an extensive application of the economic unit doctrine, up to covering situations where the ‘direction and 
control’of an undertaking over another is exercised by means of contract services, as in cases of ‘hub and 
spoke’ cartels: see, e.g., ECJ, Case C-542/14 SIA ‘VM Remonts’(formerly SIA ‘DIV un KO’) and Others v. 
Konkurences padome [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:578. Cf. Ioannis Apostolakis, Antitrust liability in cases of 
indirect contacts between competitors: VM Remonts [2017] 54 CML Rev., 605-630. 
37 ECJ, Case C –73/95 P Viho Europe BV v Commission [1996] ECR I-5457, paras 15-17. 
38 The situation referred to in the text typically produces consequences in the quantification of fines ap-
plicable since, according to Article 23, second paragraph, Regulation 1/2013, the threshold of 10% of an 
undertaking’s worldwide turnover needs to be referred to the entire group’s turnover: see, e.g., Whish and 
Bailey, supra n. 35, at 99; Ivo Van Bael and Jean-François Bellis, Il diritto comunitario della concorrenza 
991 (Giappichelli 2009). As to recourse to the economic unit doctrine for the application of administrative 
fines in Italy see, e.g., Federico Ghezzi and Mariateresa Maggiolino, L’imputazione delle sanzioni antitrust 
nei gruppi di imprese, tra responsabilità personale e finalità dissuasive [2014] Rivista delle società, 1060; 
Federico Ghezzi, Impresa e sanzioni nella prassi applicativa dell’Autorità garante della concorrenza: 
qualche problema teorico [2016] Giur. comm. I 812. 
39 See Case C-97/08 Akzo Nobel and Others v Commission, supra n. 35, at para. 60: ‘in the specific case 
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the market but strictly carried out the instructions received by the parent company. 
The arguments in favour of the application of the economic unit doctrine to antitrust 
damages actions – in order to identify the liable person – have been part of an intense 
doctrinal debate since even before the enactment of the Directive. It has been argued 
that, consistent with the application of administrative fines, an action for damages could 
be brought against either a parent company or against the subsidiary, however both joint-
ly and severally liable. 40 
An explicit and authoritative endorsement of this approach comes now from the very re-
cent ECJ case of Vantaan v. Skanska. 41 The Court, in fact, made once more clear that the 
concept of an “undertaking”, within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU, “must be under-
stood as designating an economic unit even if in law that economic unit consists of several 
persons, natural or legal”, and also that “when an entity that has committed an infringement 
of the competition rules is subject to a legal or organisational change, this change does not 
necessarily create a new undertaking free of liability for the conduct of its predecessor that 
infringed the competition rules, when, from an economic point of view, the two are identi-
cal”. 42 Furthermore, and with a greater importance for our discussion, the ECJ has stressed 
that “the concept of “undertaking”, within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU, which consti-
tutes an autonomous concept of EU law, cannot have a different scope with regard to the 
imposition of fines by the Commission under Article 23(2) of Regulation No 1/2003 as 
compared with actions for damages for infringement of EU competition rules.” 43 
Now, looking at the issue at hand from the Italian perspective, it seems that particu-
larly in the aftermath of the implementation process of the Damages Directive, the fa-
vourable arguments for an extension of the economic unit doctrine to antitrust damages 
claims have in fact been strengthened by the wordings of the rules – either European or 
Italian (“undertaking or association of undertakings”) – along with the principle of co-
herent interpretation of EU law. 44 
 
 
where a parent company has a 100% shareholding in a subsidiary which has infringed the Community 
competition rules, first, the parent company can exercise a decisive influence over the conduct of the sub-
sidiary and, second, there is a rebuttable presumption that the parent company does in fact exercise a deci-
sive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary’. 
40 See Wish and Bailey, supra n. 35, at 94. 
41 See ECJ, Case C-724/17 Vantaan kaupunki v Skanska Industrial Solutions Oy and Others [2019] 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:204. 
42 See ibid paras 37-38. 
43 See ibid para. 47. 
44 Persuasive Giorgio Afferni, Il risarcimento dei danni per violazioni del diritto della concorrenza: 
prescrizione e responsabilità solidale [2018] Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate 171, 190. 
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To the extent that, for the application of an administrative fine, the existence of an 
economic unit between two or more (natural or legal) persons implies that unit being 
held responsible for the infringement – which is to say that the parent is (also, jointly and 
severally) responsible whenever its control over the subsidiary that participated in the 
anticompetitive conduct was strict and pervasive ‒ the same should hold true as to the 
duty to compensate damages for harms caused to third parties. 
No special proof concerning the parent company’s fault should be required, since its 
responsibility arises from the mere exercise of a decisive influence over the subsidiary, 
so that the thema probandum will be the existence of that influence, at least whenever it 
could not be presumed. 
B. – The potential impact of administrative decisions on subsequent claims for dam-
ages is a great theme of the debate as regards private antitrust enforcement, in Europe as 
well as overseas. 45 
The rule on the binding effect of an infringement decision of a competition authority 
has its roots in the information asymmetry between the harmed party (the potential 
claimant) and the infringer (the potential defendant), and it promises to be the most ef-
fective instrument for overcoming this asymmetry, at least in follow-on actions. Howev-
er, while already in force in respect of the Commission’s infringement decisions, pursu-
ant to article 16(1) Regulation 1/2003, 46 it has remained a controversial issue in terms of 
a full extension to NCA decisions at all, finding strong obstacles in national law, includ-
ing the relevant Italian legislation. 
Already within its White Paper, the EU Commission expressed some critical remarks 
regarding the widespread reluctance to ascribe a binding effect to decisions having a fi-
nal character; therefore, it suggested to adopt a rule according to which national courts, 
whenever having to take decisions on damage claims, subsequent to an NCA’s final de-
cision finding an infringement of articles 101 and 102 TFEU, “cannot take decisions 
running counter to any such decision or ruling”. 47 
Almost ten years later, that rule has been finally adopted as part of a soft harmoniza-
 
 
45 See Section 5(a) of Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53). 
46 In the wake of the decision of the ECJ in Case C-344/98 Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd. [2000] 
ECR I-11369, paras 51 et seq. 
47 See European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions, supra n. 10. 
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tion regime. Article 9 Damages Directive reads that: “Member States shall ensure that an 
infringement of competition law found by a final decision of a national competition au-
thority or by a review court is deemed to be irrefutably established for the purposes of an 
action for damages brought before their national courts under Article 101 or 102 TFEU 
or under national competition law”. A narrower effect is then promoted for cross-border 
decisions, since national legislation should allow the claimant to produce them as “prima 
facie evidence”, this being a compromise between the first draft of the Directive – in fa-
vour of the attribution of a full binding effect – and the widespread concerns that are 
raised by the (not undisputed) conformity of administrative decisions and court proceed-
ings vis-a-vis the principles of a fair trial and a right of defense pursuant to article 47 Eu-
ropean Charter of Fundamental Rights and article 6(1) ECHR. 48 
Looking at this rule from the Italian law perspective, it can be said that its underlying 
principle is not entirely novel, although it is disputed. 
Beginning with a leading decision of the Court of Cassazione from 2009, 49 Italian 
courts have already recognized NCA infringement decisions as strong evidence in sub-
sequent damage claims, referring to a “prova privilegiata”, this being in-between “mere-
ly admissible evidence subject to judicial appreciation and something less than conclu-
sive evidence, owing to the fact that the defendant could theoretically adduce evidence in 
rebuttal”. 50 Furthermore, the courts have also grounded some presumptions based on this 
“evidence”, these concerning other elements of tortious liability, such as the existence of 
the harm and the causal link between the anticompetitive misconduct and the harm it-
self. 51 
Without dealing with the inconsistencies between such a broad use of presumptions 
 
 
48 See European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the EU Parliament and of the Council on cer-
tain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provi-
sions of the Member States and of the European Union, COM(2013) 404 final, Art. 9. See the comments by 
Jens-Uwe Frank, Binding effects of decisions of national authorities: I. Introduction with some comparative 
remarks from a German perspective 37-38 (Implementation of the EU Damages Directive into Member 
State law, Conference, Würzburg, 5 May 2017, Concurrences N° 3-2017); Marcella Negri, L’efficacia delle 
decisioni amministrative nel processo civile [2018] Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate 476, 518. 
49 Cf. Corte di Cassazione, no. 3640, 13 February 2009. 
50 Oliver Remien, Limitation Periods: I. Introduction 47, 48 (Implementation of the EU Damages Di-
rective into Member State Law, Conference, Würzburg, 5 May 2017, Concurrences N° 3-2017). A critical 
position towards the referenced approach is expressed by Aldo Frignani, La difesa disarmatanelle cause 
follow-on per danno antitrust. La Cassazione in Guerra con se stessa [2013] Mercato Concorrenza e Rego-
le 429. 
51 Among others see Corte di Cassazione, no. 10211, 10 May 2011. 
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for assessing crucial elements of a tort law remedy, it should be noted that the main con-
cerns have been expressed with regard to basic principles of the Italian legal system: the 
rigid separation between administrative and judicial power, on the one hand, and the full 
autonomy that is granted to the latter, on the other (grounded either on article 24(2) or 
article 101(2) Italian Constitution). And this is not to mention those concerns related to 
articles 47 European Charter of Fundamental Rights and 6(1) ECHR, particularly in the 
wake of the ECtHR cases Menarini and Grande Stevens. 52 
In general terms, the judge – being subject to the law only, pursuant to Article 101(2) 
Italian Constitution – should be totally free to evaluate the relevant facts, or at least not 
bound to a specific reconstruction of them provided by an administrative decision. 53 
This premise is of paramount importance in understanding the rationale behind the 
way how Italian lawmakers have implemented Article 9 Damages Directive. 
Article 7(1) Decree 3/2017, at least in its first part, provides an almost faithful transla-
tion of its European counterpart, by declaring as binding – in subsequent damages ac-
tions – an NCA infringement decision, provided that it is final, that it was confirmed by 
the reviewing court or that it was not challenged in due time. 
Continuing on with our reading of the article, we then find a compromise – or an at-
tempt at one ‒ which was caused by the uncertainties that have been identified above: 
Pursuant to Article 7(1) second part, the binding effect of an administrative decision 
rests on the fact that – before becoming final – it can be challenged before a court having 
full jurisdiction over the matter; the administrative court’s judicial review covers either 
the facts upon which the challenged decision is grounded or the “technical assessments 
which are not characterized by a substantial margin of appreciation”. 54 
Such a formulation is, however, not fully persuasive and does not dispel all doubts 
since it seems to exempt from a full review those economic assessments that are at the 
basis of competition law enforcement; 55 that is why, although the last paragraph of the 
 
 
52 See ECtHR, no. 43509/08, Menarini Diagnostics v Italia, 27 October 2011; ECtHR, no. 18640/10, 
Grande Stevens and Others v Italy, 4 March 2014. See also the critical remarks expressed by Gianroberto 
Villa, La Direttiva europea sul risarcimento del danno antitrust: riflessioni in vista dell’attuazione [2015] 
Il Corriere Giuridico 301, 306; Giuseppe Guizzi, La sentenza CEDU 4 marzo 2014 e il sistema delle pote-
stà sanzionatorie delle Autorità amministrative indipendenti: sensazioni di un civilista [2014] Il Corriere 
giuridico 1321; Giussani, supra n. 33, at 251 et seq. 
53 For insightful remarks see Giussani, supra n. 33, at 252 and footnote 3. 
54 See Negri, supra n. 48, at 494 et seq. 
55 See Gianroberto Villa, L’attuazione della Direttiva sul risarcimento del danno per violazione delle 
norme sulla concorrenza [2017] Il Corriere giuridico 441, 445-446. For the opposing view see Nicoletta 
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Italian transposition states (as does article 9 Damages Directive) that the “binding effect 
rule” comes “without prejudice to the rights and obligations of national courts under Ar-
ticle 267 TFEU”, some scholars argue that the courts may exercise a refusal to apply-
power, whenever they find that the concerned decision is manifestly illegal. 56 
Moreover, some remarks are needed as to the borders, either objective or subjective, 
set on the binding effect of NCA decisions. 
First, the Directive and its implementation rule refer to infringement decisions only; 
this means that no binding effect can be ascribed to other kinds of decisions, such as 
commitment decisions. 
Second, according to the indications contained in Recital 34 Damages Directive, the 
Italian legislature has circumscribed the binding effect to the nature of the infringement 
and its material, personal, temporal and territorial scope, as determined by the competi-
tion authority or the review court. It follows that other crucial issues for the damages 
claim, like causation and the assessment of an individual harm suffered by the plaintiff, 
are left to the regular rules on the burden of proof, as integrated by the special regime of 
rebuttable presumptions that is traced by articles 14(2) and 17(2) Damage Directive (ar-
ticles 12(2) and 14(2) Decree 3/2017). 
Third, as to the subjective perimeter, the Italian provision is clear in restricting the 
binding effect of the infringement decision to the infringer only. The rationale behind 
this rule is quite clear: it ensures that the binding effect is limited to the person that has 
been involved in the prior administrative proceeding. 
Some interpretative tensions are easily foreseeable in the wake of the ECJ’s Kone deci-
sion: 57 in cases of umbrella pricing, while the ECJ has stated the liability of the cartelists, 
it has not excluded that the cartelist(s) could, after being held liable for the damages suf-
fered by the rival undertaking’s contractual counterpart who paid an umbrella price, later 
bring an action against that competitor for its conduct. In this event, such an action will be 
a sort of stand-alone action in the sense that the cartelist(s) will not benefit from any NCA 
infringement decision concerning the umbrella pricing conduct, held by the rival. 58 
A final remark deserves to be made with regard to decisions of foreign NCAs: they 
 
 
Rangone, D.lgs 19 gennaio 2017, n. 3: profili amministrativistici [2018] Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commenta-
te, 255, 265-266. 
56 See Negri, supra n. 48, at 494 et seq., 499; Marcella Negri, Binding effect of decisions of national au-
thorities: III. Italy 37, para 26 (Implementation of the EU Damages Directive into Member State Law, Con-
ference, Würzburg, 5 May 2017, Concurrences N° 3-2017). 
57 ECJ, Case C-510/11 P Kone AG and Others v European Commission [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:696. 
58 See Giussani, supra n. 33, at 253. 
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have no binding effect and the European legislature refers to them as constituting “prima 
facie evidence”. This concept is unknown to the Italian law of evidence; therefore, and 
wisely, Italian lawmakers opted for the term “proof”. Cross-border decisions are thus an 
admissible (simple) means of proof among other means and are subject to the free 
judge’s persuasion. 59 
C. – The issue of limitation is a sensitive subject matter since it is capable of impeding 
the exercise of the right to compensation or significantly jeopardizing the level playing 
field between market participants from State to State, even triggering forum shopping. 
It shall suffice here to mention the concerns expressed by the ECJ in its Manfredi 
judgment, 60 which nevertheless recalled the Member States’competence on the issue, 
“provided that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are observed”; and suf-
fice it also to mention the suggestions contained in the Commission’s White Paper 61 
on achieving the proper balance between legal certainty and the effectiveness of the 
right to sue. 
As clearly stressed in the Manfredi case, having the limitation period commence from 
the day on which the agreement or concerted practice is adopted could make it impossi-
ble to exercise the right to seek compensation for the harm caused, and such a risk be-
comes greater as the length of the limitation period becomes shorter, particularly when it 
is not capable of being suspended. 62 These were precisely the main features of the Italian 
law in force at the time that decision was handed down. 
Pursuant to article 2947 Italian CC, the right to compensation in a tort liability case 
had a limitation period of five years, starting from the day when the fact occurred. This 
wording traditionally gave rise to a strict interpretation, according to which the limitation 
period should be understood as running from the day when the harm was provoked. 
However, just a few years after the Manfredi case, the Italian Court of Cassazione 
adopted a less rigid reading of the prescription rule, done by emphasizing a coordination 
between article 2947 Italian CC and the general legal provision, contained in article 2935 
Italian CC. 
 
 
59 See, e.g., Chieppa, supra n. 23, at 306; Rangone, supra n. 55, at 268. 
60 See Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi, supra n. 7, at paras 77-82. 
61 See European Commission, White Paper on Damages actions, supra n. 10. 
62 See Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi, supra n. 7, at para. 78. 
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Pursuant to the latter article, the limitation period begins to run from “the day when 
the right can be exercised”; a “dies a quo” that the Court held to be the moment when 
the person having the right to sue has a concrete chance, if acting diligently, to learn 
about the occurrence of the harm, its relevance in legal terms 63 and the identity of the 
tortfeasor. 64 
That being said, and apart for a couple of explicit provisions – concerning the express 
relevance of an ongoing or terminated administrative investigation/proceeding, on the 
one hand, and the prerequisite that the violation causing the harm has ended before a 
right to sue is enforceable, on the other ‒ it can be observed that the Italian law in force 
prior to the Damages Directive seemed to be already quite in line with the cornerstones 
of the harmonized regime laid down in this European instrument. 
Pursuant to article 10 Damages Directive, the European text requires Member States 
to adopt legislation prescribing that the commencement of the limitation period is fixed 
“not before the infringement of competition law has ceased and the claimant knows, or 
can reasonably be expected to know” specific circumstances regarding the behaviour 
(and the fact that it constitutes an infringement of competition law), the fact that the in-
fringement caused harm and the identity of the infringer. 
Furthermore, the Directive fixes a minimum length of five years, and there are also 
specific legal provisions for suspending the limitation period once the competition au-
thority takes action for the purpose of the investigation. 
Moving back to Italy, article 8 Decree 3/2017 provides a faithful translation of the Di-
rective’s provision, along with an exercise “at the minimum level allowed” of the only 
discretionary power conferred upon the States: the length of the limitation period. That is 
because Italian lawmakers fixed it at five years – in conformity with the general provi-
sion on tortious liability – and decided moreover not to fix any “absolute limitation peri-
od”, although this is encouraged in Recital 36 Damages Directive. 65 
Yet appearances are sometimes deceiving, and as soon as we go beyond such a mini-
mal approach and the general overall coherence, a concern arises in the wake of the im-
plementation process. Specifically, while article 10 Damages Directive simply lists facts 
and the circumstances that the entitled person need to know – or should be aware of – 
before having the chance to exercise the right to claim damages, the Italian transposition 
 
 
63 Which is to say, about its being a ‘danno ingiusto’ under article 2043 CC. 
64 Cf. Corte di Cassazione, no. 2305, 2 February 2007 regarding an antitrust claim for damages follow-
ing the detection of a horizontal prohibited cartel between car insurance undertakings. 
65 See, e.g., Villa, supra n., at 441. 
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(article 8 Decree 3/2017) requires that these facts be fulfilled in a cumulative manner; 
the resulting negative outcome – undeniably undermining the certainty of law ‒ is that, 
properly in cases of stand-alone actions, the full discovery of these elements (i.e. the dies 
a quo for limitation) could even occur a considerable time after the violation at issue was 
committed, a risk that is all the greater because Italy has not adopted an “absolute limita-
tion period”. 66 
D. – The Damages Directive lacks any provisions on collective redress. It contains 
rules neither on class actions nor on representative actions. Along with the exclusion of 
any overcompensation laid down in article 3(3) Damages Directive, this gap deepens the 
rift between the emerging European model of private antitrust enforcement and the over-
seas benchmark, i.e. the US system, where a combination of treble damages and the 
availability of an opt-out class action creates a positive combination of (optimal) deter-
rence and adequate incentives to sue. While the adoption of a merely compensatory re-
gime is a deliberate, final choice, coherent with the function (compensatory) and charac-
teristics of the tort remedy in Europe, 67 the current reference made by the newly harmo-
nized rules to individual actions – or at least their silence on aggregate litigation – main-
ly hides the difficulties of an ongoing planning stage. 68 
The importance of collective redress as a sort of flywheel for private antitrust en-
forcement has been stressed many times by the European Commission, through a series 
of documents and initiatives: the Green and White Papers on Damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules, the Green Paper of 2008 on consumer collective re-
dress, not to mention the public consultation of 2011 “Towards a more coherent Euro-
pean approach to collective redress”. 
Particularly in the White Paper on Damages actions, the Commission stressed how 
“[i]ndividual consumers, but also small businesses, especially those who have suffered 
scattered and relatively low-value damage, are often deterred from bringing an individu-
 
 
66 See Afferni, supra n. 44, at 171-178; see also Vincenzo Meli, Introduzione al D.lgs 19 gennaio 2017 
n. 3, di attuazione della Dir. 2014/104/UE sul risarcimento dei danni per violazione della normativa anti-
trust [2018] Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate 119, 138. 
67 See Heinemann, supra n. 13, at 637. 
68 On the issue in general terms, see, e.g., Christopher Hoodges, The Reform of Class and Representa-
tive Actions in European Legal Systems (Hart Publishing 2008); See also Thomas M. J. Möllers and 
Bernahrd Pregler, Civil law enforcement and collective redress in economic law [2013] Europa e Diritto 
Privato, 27, 55. 
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al action for damages by the costs, delays, uncertainties, risks and burdens involved”; a 
remark whose importance is even greater today in light of the option, chosen by the Di-
rective, in favour of an offensive use of passing-on and also the explicit extension of 
standing requirements to indirect purchasers. 69 
Given, however, that collective redress mechanisms can play a pivotal role for the en-
tire enforcement of individual rights conferred by the EU law, the European Parliament, 
in 2012, adopted the resolution “Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective 
Redress” and claimed for a wider harmonization process, one to be achieved through a 
“horizontal framework including a common set of principles providing uniform access 
to justice via collective redress within the Union and specifically but not exclusively 
dealing with the infringement of consumer rights”. Undeniably an ambitious goal, one 
whose result has at least in the short run been the weakening of any harmonization pro-
cess on collective redress, as shown by the mere adoption of a Commission Recommen-
dation (the Commission Recommendation 2013/396 “on common principles for injunc-
tive and compensatory collective redress mechanisms”) – thus, while waiting to take two 
steps forward, one step back – or aside – has been taken instead. 70 
Notwithstanding the lack of a harmonized regime at EU level, some countries have 
already adopted some sort of collective redress mechanisms, and Italy is one of them. 
Pursuant to article 140 bis of the Italian Consumer Code (Legislative Decree n. 206 of 
2015) (hereafter: Italian ConsumerC), an opt-in class action is in fact available for grant-
 
 
69 The choice on passing-on that is made by the Damages Directive is, as known, dissonant with the US 
model, whereas, in the wake of two leading Supreme Court decisions, indirect purchasers have no standing 
to bring (individual/class) damages actions: Hanover Shoe Inc v United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 US. 
481 (1968); Illinois Brick Co. V State of Illinois, 431 US 720 (1977). See, e.g., William M. Landes and 
Richard Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic 
Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick [1979] 46 Univ. Chic. L. Rev. 602, 608; Gregory J. Werden and Mari-
us Schwartz, Illinois Brick and the Deterrence of Antitrust Violations – An Economic Analysis [1984] 35 
Hastings Law Journal 629 et seq.; Herbert Hoverkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition 
and its Practice 615 et seq. (2nd ed., West Group 1999). For critical remarks see, however, Stephens Cal-
kins, An Enforcement Official’s Reflections on Antitrust Class Action [1997] 39 Ariz. Law Rev. 413, 424; 
Adam Thimmesch, Beyond Treble Damages: Hanover Shoe and Direct Purchaser Suits After Cames v Mi-
crosoft Corp. [2005] 90 Iowa Law Rev. 1649 et seq. 
70 For critical remarks about the choice made see, e.g., Josef Drexl, ‘Private and Public Enforcement of 
EU Competition Law’ in Hans-W. Micklitz and Andrea Wechsler (eds), The Transformation of Enforce-
ment. European Economic Law in a Global Perspective 135, 156 (Hart Publishing 2016). See also the 
comments contained within Directorate-General for International Policies, Collective Redress in Antitrust: 
study, IP/A/ECON/ ST/2011-19–PE75.120, 12, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/ 
index.html > Collective redress > Study on legislative action in the area of collective redress in the field of 
antitrust (accessed 24 April 2019). 
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ing damages (or restitution) in cases where consumers’homogeneous rights are violated 
by a series of conduct, including anticompetitive conduct. 71 Accordingly, the domestic 
implementation of the Damages Directive, pursuant to article 1 Decree 3/2017, explicitly 
extends its range of application to antitrust damages claims brought in the form of ag-
gregate litigation. 
Meanwhile, on 3 April 2019, the Italian Parliament approved (Ddl 844/19), a new 
comprehensive regulation on class actions whose entry into force is postponed until 
twelve months after the date of publication in the Gazzetta Ufficiale. The new regime 
consists of several articles amending the Italian CPC (art. 840 bis – 840 sexiesdecies) 
and is intended to replace the still valid article 140 bis of the Italian ConsumerC). The 
new class action abandons its exclusive reference to consumers, becoming instead a gen-
eral technique of aggregate litigation for damages or restitutionary claims arising from 
any violation (including antitrust violations) of homogeneous individual rights of the 
class members, and it is available against undertakings, either private and public, the lat-
ter as entrusted with the operation of public services. 
Of course, it is impossible to say anything as regards the practical impact that the new 
rules will have on antitrust private enforcement. In any event, since most of the new 
rules share many of their main features with the regime laid down in art 140 bis of Ital-
ian ConsumerC, several critical remarks already valid for the latter will apply to the for-
mer too, strengthening the argument that the Italian model is not – as of now – an effi-
cient substitute for the missing EU class action. 
As clearly pointed out by the DGIP’s Study on Collective Redress in Antitrust, we 
should first note that an opt-in mechanism, even though it has the advantage of limiting 
the risks of unmeritorious actions, entails a low participation rate. Low rates are a signif-
icant drawback to effective antitrust law enforcement, being no less problematic than the 
absence of economic incentives to sue (i.e. punitive damages) combined with the typical 
occurrence of parceled and low-value damages. 72 Moreover, along with legal standing 
being restricted to individual consumers, 73 a further bottleneck stems from the need for 
 
 
71 See, e.g., Enrico Camilleri, Azione di classe a tutela dei consumatori e comportamenti anticoncorren-
ziali: criticità (e velleità) di un tentativo di trade-off [2010] AIDA 415 et seq. 
72 Directorate-General for International policies, supra n. 70, at 13. By contrast, the Commission Rec-
ommendation 2013/396/EU of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collec-
tive redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law 
[2013], OJ L201/60, Art. 21-24, is in favour of the ‘opt-in’ method. 
73 Such a circumscription of the legitimate claimants to consumers implies, of course, the exclusion of 
intermediate buyers/sellers.  
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homogeneity of claimants’rights, this being a premise for recognizing the existence of 
the class and, thus, the admissibility of the action brought. 
The “homogeneity” prerequisite – still required by the amendments of 2019 ‒ in fact 
gives rise to judicial uncertainty between (i) a rigid interpretation, according to which the 
same kind of individual consequences (types of harms), originating from an antitrust vio-
lation, 74 are needed and (ii) a more recent, open approach, according to which homoge-
neity should be conceived simply in relation to the same origin of individual harm, with-
out thereby precluding a differentiation into sub-classes as regards nature and amount. 75 
Further drawbacks refer to the damages awarded. Pursuant to article 140 bis(12) Italian 
ConsumerC, in the event of success, claimants may obtain a judge’s equitable estimation 
of the damages or the establishment of a homogeneous criterion to be applied for quantifi-
cation. In both cases, even if with different nuances, the outcome of the lawsuit is a “ball-
park figure” evaluation, at high risk of yielding under-compensation and therefore at risk 
of dissuading more than incentivizing individual adhesion, especially given that it implies 
relinquishing the right to bring individual actions (either for damages or restitutions) that 
are grounded on the same facts as the collective claim. The same critical remark seems al-
so valid with reference to the new discipline introduced by the Italian CPC, at least when 
reading the vague formulation of Article 840 sexies (sub letters a and h). 
If these elements are not disheartening enough, the overall picture on Italian class ac-
tions for antitrust infringement is worsened even further by the implementation of the 
Damages Directive: pursuant to article 18 Decree 3/2017, actions for damages, either indi-
vidual or collective, can be brought only before the specialized sections (“sezione special-
izzata in materia di impresa”) of three Tribunals: Milan, Rome and Naples. The rationale 
behind this provision is to ensure a high expertise from the courts, given the complicated 
legal and economic issues involved in these type of claims. The negative side effect of this 
choice of lawmakers is, however, to make the existing bottleneck even narrower. 
5. – There are two more missing pieces to the puzzle of EU antitrust private enforce-
ment, two pieces that have been disregarded or are least not adequately dealt with by the 
new harmonized regime on damage claims, despite being pivotal for its optimal func-
tioning in practice: causation and quantification of damages. 
 
 
74 See, e.g., Tribunale di Milano, ord. 8 November 2013, Altro consumo-Bianchi (e altri) c/Trenord s.r.l. 
75 See Corte d’Appello di Milano, no. 2828, 25 August 2017, overruling Tribunale di Milano, ord. 8 
November 2013; Corte d’Appello di Torino, 30 June 2016; Corte d’Appello di Milano, ord. 3 March 2014. 
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Causation is a structural constituent element of tortious liability, an element whose 
role within the framework of the remedy is to ensure that the tortfeasor is liable only for 
the harm that is the immediate and direct outcome of his/her conduct. 76 
In terms of antitrust damages actions, the importance of the causation nexus becomes 
even greater than in traditional tort actions since – as is common in cases of pure economic 
loss – there is a typical dispersion of losses through the market and “the victims are not only 
competitors, but also rivals, suppliers and firms operating in complementary markets”. 77 
Moreover, the wider the range of interests that the violated norm is meant to protect, 
the more crucial the need will be to use the causation requirement as tool to control the 
floodgates and access to the remedy. This effect is even stronger in competition law 
since it is meant to protect general interests (such as a competitive structure or the com-
petition on a given market) within which a set of more specific interests are represented. 
The distortion of a competitive market is often an event causing multiple injuries. 
One anticompetitive action may simultaneously cause damages to competitors, to com-
panies operating at different market levels and to final consumers. Therefore, in order to 
prevent that a violation of such a general interest also implies an unmanageable number 
of follow-on damages actions, the link between a specific anticompetitive conduct and 
the harm that can be described as directly related to this conduct needs to be stringent. 
The ECJ has many times stressed the pivotal role played by the causation requirement 
for antitrust damages claims, despite pointing out that this issue is governed by national 
law given the lack of a common European doctrine on the issue. 78 However, notwith-
standing this awareness, or perhaps exactly because of it, the Damages Directive does 
not introduce any specific provision on causation, while the Italian implementation only 
indirectly refers to it in the context of the quantification of damages; pursuant to article 
14 Decree 3/17: Compensation for damages caused by a violation of the law of competi-
 
 
76 Isabelle C. Durant, ‘Causation’ in Helmut Koziol and Reiner Schulze (eds), Tort Law of the Europe-
an Community 63 (Springer 2008). 
77 See, e.g., Pedro Caro de Sousa, EU and national approaches to passing on and causation in competi-
tion damages cases: a doctrine in search of balance (2018) 55 CML Rev. 1751, 1780; see also Ioannis Li-
anos, Peter Davis & Paolisa Nebbia, Damages Claims for the Infringement of EU Competition Law 103 
(Oxford University Press 2015). 
78 See, as leading cases on the issue, Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi, supra n. 7, at para. 
61-64; Case C-510/11 Kone and Others v Commission, supra n. 57, at paras 22-24; Case C-360/09 Pfeider-
er, supra n. 4, at para. 28; ECJ, Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap v Otis NV and Others [2012] 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:684, para. 43. See also ECJ, Case 48/72 Brasserie de Haecht v Wilkin II [1973] ECR 77. 
For a wider analysis of the ECJ’s posture on the theme see Caroline Cauffman, The DCFR and the Attempts 
to Increase the Private Enforcement of Competition Law: Convergences and Divergences (2010) 18 ERPL, 
1079-1105. 
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tion due to the injured person must be determined according to the provisions of articles 
1223 (…) of the Italian CC. 79 
That being said, causation is commonly conceived as having a twofold meaning: On 
the one hand there is “causation-in-fact”, which is used in order to establish a link be-
tween the wrongful conduct of the tortfeasor and the harm suffered by the victim (the 
standard usually applied to determine this link is the “but-for” test). On the other hand 
there is “legal causation”, which is used in order to limit the extent of an attributable 
harm for which the tortfeasor can be held liable 80 and which is oriented on two main 
functions: the explanatory and the attributive functions, 81 the fulfillment of which rest on 
the use of several tests and formulas that express concepts regarding proximity, foresee-
ability, scope of the rule etc. 
The combined effect of both these meanings makes clear the distance between the 
scientific and the legal discourse on causation, the former aiming at the prediction of fu-
ture events, given specific antecedents, and therefore mainly pertaining to an ex ante 
evaluation; the latter aiming at the attribution of responsibility to an agent in light of 
his/her actions or omissions, which is to say a typical ex post, counterfactual analysis. 
This usual interplay between causation in fact and legal causation proves, however, to 
be much more complex in antitrust cases as the more removed the harm (pecuniary loss) 
suffered in the supply chain is, the weaker the causal link between that harm and the 
wrongful conduct (antitrust infringement) that is supposed to be its direct cause, to the 
point of the link disappearing entirely, especially whenever a contract works as a dia-
phragm between the conduct and the event. 
The latter situation typically occurs in the context of cartels and downstream con-
tracts, where the tension – if not the divergences – between an economic approach and a 
legal approach to causation can be easily described. 
And in fact, even if from an economic point of view the harm suffered by a contrac-
tual counterpart – independent of whether a direct counterpart or even an indirect pur-
 
 
79 Art. 1223 of the Italian Civil Code is a norm explicitly provided for a breach of contract, but it is also 
applicable to tort law; it reads as follows: ‘The compensation for damage … must therefore include the loss 
suffered by the creditor as loss of income, as it is an immediate and direct consequence thereof’. 
80 See, e.g., Ioannis Lianos, Causal Uncertainty and Damages Claims for Infringement of Competition 
Law in Europe, CLES Research Paper Series 2/2015, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/sites/cles/files/cles-2-
2015.pdf (accessed 24 April 2019); Lianos, Davis & Nebbia, supra n. 77, at 75 . As for the Italian law of 
torts see, e.g., Massimo Franzoni, ‘Dei fatti illeciti: artt. 2043-2059’ in Francesco Galgano (ed.), Commen-
tario del Codice Civile Scialoja-Branca, 84 (Zanichelli 1993). 
81 See, Antony Honoré, ‘Causation in the Law’ in Edward n. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2010 edn). 
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chaser, supplier or client – is directly linked to the upstream restrictive agreement, from 
a private law viewpoint that harm, consisting for example of an inflated price, is but the 
direct effect of the contract itself. And the contract will not only be the result of a meet-
ing of minds involving the counterpart’s will; rather, it is the only “fact” capable, as 
such, of causing the harmful event. More precisely, while the contract can be described 
as the sole proximate cause of the harm (i.e. the cause in the absence of which the effect 
would not have happened), upstream antitrust infringement is but a secondary one (i.e. 
an event in the absence of which the effect would not have been prevented). 
Italian jurisprudence has, particularly in more recent years, tried to handle this critical 
issue by embracing a wide use of rebuttable presumptions: according to some decisions 
taken by the Court of Cassazione, 82 mainstream economic analyses provide a reliable 
ground for presuming that a cartel is the direct cause of a damage to the whole market, 
once its existence has been proved. This is a rebuttable presumption, of course, in the 
sense that the defendant can prove the interruption of any causal link between the anti-
trust infringement and the harm. 
It should be noted that such an interpretation is quite disputed in Italy since it subverts 
the general rule about the burden of proof and, above all, since it relies excessively on a 
probabilistic method – the “more likely than not” rule –working better as regards causa-
tion in fact than for legal causation, the latter requiring a specific, individualized evalua-
tion of the facts. 83 
These queries have now been even further sharpened by the Damages Directive and 
its implementing rules. It suffices to mention that article 3 Damages Directive stresses – 
consistent with the case law of the ECJ – that “any natural or legal person who has suf-
fered harm caused by an infringement of competition law” has to be able to claim and 
obtain full compensation for that harm, a formula that, in light of the Directive, involves 
indirect purchasers of the infringers 84 as well as third parties that have been harmed by 
an “umbrella price”. 85 
 
 
82 See, among the others, Corte di Cassazione, no. 11904, 28 May 2014; Corte di Cassazione, no. 9116, 
23 April 2014. 
83 Roberto Pardolesi, Note minime in tema di nesso di causalità [2014] Concorrenza e mercato 317, 321. 
84 As regards the likelihood that damages claims could really be brought by indirect purchasers, it has 
been rightly observed that ‘[i]n the overwhelming of cases, damages actions are brought by direct purchas-
ers’whereas it is ‘extremely rare that they are introduced by indirect purchasers’: see Lianos, Davis & 
Nebbia, supra n. 77, at 104. On ‘indirect purchasers’’ standing within the framework of the Damages Di-
rective and the Directive’s national implementation in Italy, see Enrico Camilleri, Il trasferimento del so-
vrapprezzo anticoncorrenziale nella Direttiva 2014/104/UE [2015] AIDA 32; Francesco Mezzanotte, Il 
trasferimento del sovrapprezzo anticoncorrenziale [2018] Le Nuove Leggi Civili Commentate 215. 
85 This in the wake of the Kone case: Case C-510/11 Kone and Others v Commission, supra n. 57. 
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In any event, particularly in the latter cases, the antitrust violation really seems to be 
too remote from the harm, so that a finding of liability appears to heed a policy directive 
more than the main features of a tort remedy. In other words, the remedy in tort seems 
capable of intercepting the closest harm caused by the wrongful conduct, but it cannot 
encompass the whole perimeter within which the distorting wave propagates. 
That being said, we may wonder which kind of damage it is that we are presuming. 
Which harm we are talking about? What is in fact “more likely than not” is that an anti-
trust infringement, and more precisely a cartel, inflicts damage on the market as a whole 
and not a parceled individual harm. And this is twice as true as soon as we refer to ex-
clusionary practices. 86 
This remark introduces the last critical point that deserves to be underlined: the issue 
of quantification of damages. 
In granting the right to a full compensation, the Directive evokes either the damnum 
emergens and the lucrum cessans. Pursuant to article 3(2) Damages Directive: “Full 
compensation shall place a person who has suffered harm in the position in which that 
person would have been had the infringement of competition law not been committed. It 
shall therefore cover the right to compensation for actual loss and for loss of profit, plus 
the payment of interest”. 
This reading recalls Mommsen’s Differenztheorie; a theory, however, whose applica-
tion in antitrust cases proves to be highly inadequate since the quantification of damages 
(suffered by third parties) rests on complex, counterfactual analyses that are properly 
based on economic data. 
As commendably observed overseas, “[t]he marriage between economics and … anti-
trust policy becomes rocky when it reaches the law of damages (...) the law of damages 
has the much more difficult task of quantifying injury; the difference between saying that 
a certain practice is harmful and quantifying the amount of harm can be significant”. 87 
Now, in order to soften this burden of proof for plaintiffs, the Directive introduces at 
least two rebuttable presumptions: that of article 17(2), according to which “[i]t shall be 
presumed that cartel infringements cause harm” and that contained in article 14, regard-
ing the presumption of the passing-on of overcharges: “In the situation referred to in par-
 
 
86 See, e.g., Mario Libertini, La determinazione del danno risarcibile nella proposta di Direttiva comu-
nitaria sul risarcimento del danno antitrust. Alcune osservazioni preliminary [2014] Concorrenza e Mer-
cato 265. 
87 See Herbert Hovenkamp, A Primer on Antitrust Damages, University of Iowa Legal Studies Research 
Paper, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1685919 (accessed 24 April 2019). 
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agraph 1, the indirect purchaser shall be deemed to have proven that a passing-on to that 
indirect purchaser occurred where that indirect purchaser has shown that: (a) the defend-
ant has committed an infringement of competition law; (b) the infringement of competi-
tion law has resulted in an overcharge for the direct purchaser of the defendant; and (c) 
the indirect purchaser has purchased the goods or services that were the object of the in-
fringement of competition law, or has purchased goods or services derived from or con-
taining them.” 
In any event, these presumptions apply to cartels only, whereas they are not capable 
of capturing other infringements, like exclusionary or exploitative conduct; moreover, 
they provide a provisional answer to the question whether the harm does exist, without 
saying anything as to the main quantification of damages suffered. The plaintiff and the 
judge should therefore handle on their own this issue. They could of course refer to soft 
law texts like the Commission’s Guidelines on the quantification of damages, but the 
complex economic assessments involved suggest that the Court requires specialized as-
sistance, either from an NCA or from other institutions or persons. 
The two likely outcomes are both negative: either an equitable estimation (with the 
implied risks of over-estimations or under-estimations) or a sort of damnum in re ipsa. 88 
In any case, what results is something that is far from the proclaimed goal of full com-
pensation, something that is instead, as stressed regarding the causality nexus, a forced 
application of tortious liability. 
In conclusion, although paradoxical at a first glance, it seems that the Damages Di-
rective on non-contractual liability even worsens the interplay between competition law 
(goals) and private law remedies. It is an interplay whose critical attributes have been 
clearly summarized in querying whether competition policy is “a tool to protect the 
competitive process and to serve the public goals or …. primarily an instrument of con-
sumer protection” . 89 It is, as well, self-evident that agreement on the first alternative – 
 
 
88 Which is, in any event, strongly opposed by the Court of Cassazione: see, e.g., Corte di Cassazione, 
no. 1931, 25 January 2017; Corte di Cassazione, no. 207, 08 January 2019. 
89 See Josef Drexl, Beatrix Conde Gallego et al., Comments by the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual 
Property, Competition and Tax Law, on the White Paper by the Directorate-General of Competition on 
Damages Actions for Breach of EC Antitrust Rules [2008] IIC 799. For critical remarks see also Jürgen 
Basedow, ‘Recognition of Foreign Decisions within the European Competition Network’ in Jürgen 
Basedow, Jörg Philipp Terhechte and Ludos Tichý (eds), Private Enforcement of Competition Law 169, 
171 (Nomos 2011). See also Heike Schweizer, ‘Competition Law and Public Policy: Reconsidering an Un-
easy Relationship – The Example of Article 81’ in Josef Drexl, Laurence Idot & Joël Monéger (eds), Eco-
nomic Theory and Competition Law 134, 145 (Edward Edgar Publishing 2009). 
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thereby also following some hints from the ECJ itself 90 ‒ would make clear the incon-
sistencies in the scope of private law tools (remedies) as deputed to solve conflicts be-
tween particular interests. 
The fact is that the Damages Directive, beyond any apparent paradox, simply corrob-
orates this thesis, by fashioning a sort of allotrope of the classical private law remedy in 
tort, an allotrope in relation to which what is written as “private interest” should be re-
garded as general (public) interest: 91 that one towards the regulation of markets. 
The time when antitrust private enforcement development was supposed to be a fly-
wheel for a European private law – parallel to or at least harmonious with the most ad-
vanced projects for a “codification” of the latter, such as seen with the DCFR 92 – really 
belong to a past phase in the process of European integration. 
 
 
90 See ECJ, Joined Cases C-468/06 and C-478/06 Lélos kai Sia and Others v GlaxoSmithKline [2008] 
ECR I-7139, paras 65-66. 
91 See, e.g., Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Efficient and/or Effective Enforcement, in Josef Drexl, Laurence 
Idot & Joël Monéger (eds), Economic Theory and Competition Law, 211 (Edward Edgar Publishing 2009). 
92 See, e.g., Cauffman, supra n. 78. 
